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Decision making is thought to be guided by the values of alternative options and involve the accumulation of evidence to an internal
bound. However, in natural behavior, evidence accumulation is an active process whereby subjects decide when and which sensory
stimulus to sample. These sampling decisions are naturally served by attention and rapid eye movements (saccades), but little is known
about how saccades are controlled to guide future actions. Here we review evidence that was discussed at a recent symposium, which
suggests that information selection involves basal ganglia and corticalmechanisms and that, across different contexts, it is guided by two
central factors: the gains in reward and gains in information (uncertainty reduction) associated with sensory cues.
Introduction
Over the past decades, many studies have probed the single-cell
basis of simple decisions, taking as a model system the oculomo-
tor (eye movement) system of nonhuman primates. In these in-
vestigations, monkeys are trained to choose among several
options based on a simple rule, and report their decision bymak-
ing a rapid eye movement (saccade). In general, these studies
support the idea that decisions are guided by the values of alter-
native options and involve the accumulation of evidence to an
internal bound (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Kable and Glimcher,
2009).
The progress made by these investigations sets the stage for
addressing more complex questions about eye movement deci-
sions in natural behavior. Unlike in laboratory paradigms where
the subject’s goal is simply tomake a saccade, in natural behavior
eye movements are tightly coordinated with subsequent actions
and serve a specific purpose: to accumulate sensory evidence rel-
evant to those actions (Tatler et al., 2011). Thus, evidence accu-
mulation is not a passive process as it is currently portrayed.
Instead, it requires active decisions as to when and which source
of information to sample.
Therefore, a central open question is how are saccades guided
so as to sample information? Although the answers to this ques-
tion are just beginning to be investigated, the studies presented at
a recent symposium suggest that this guidance rests on three
factors. One factor is the direct association between stimuli and
rewards. These associations are learned and retained on long time
scales, involve basal ganglia and cortical structures, and can au-
tomatically bias attention even when they are irrelevant to a cur-
rent action. A second factor is the operant value of an action that
is, what a subject expects to gain from a sensorimotor task or an
economic choice. And a final factor is the uncertainty involved in
the task, or the gains in information that a saccade is expected to
bring.
The lateral intraparietal area (LIP) encodes visual salience
based on novelty and reward
Inmonkeys, saccade generation involves the transmission of sen-
sory information from the visual system to two cortical oculomo-
tor areas, the frontal eye field (FEF) and the LIP, which in turn
send descending projections to subcortical motor structures, in-
cluding the basal ganglia, superior colliculus, and brainstemmo-
tor nuclei (Fig. 1A). The FEF and LIP are of special interest
because they play key roles in saccadic decisions. Both areas con-
tain populations of target-selective cells that have visual re-
sponses and spatial receptive fields (RFs) and respond very
selectively to stimuli that attract attention or gaze (Thompson
and Bichot, 2005; Bisley and Goldberg, 2010). These neurons
seem to convey a consistent message in a variety of tasks — the
location of an attention-worthy object in the visual scene
(Thompson and Bichot, 2005; Bisley and Goldberg, 2010). Ex-
periments using microstimulation or reversible inactivation sug-
gest that the LIP and FEF exert remote effects both on motor
structures, biasing these structures to generate a saccade to the
selected location, and on the visual system, generating top-down
attentional enhancement of the selected item (Awh et al., 2006;
Squire et al., 2013).
In contrast with this extensive knowledge of their properties
and functional effects, very little is known about the genesis of the
LIP and FEF target selection responses. How do the neurons in
these areas acquire their selective responses, and how do they
“know” which stimulus to sample?
A result that has been influential in addressing this question is
the finding that target selection responses in LIP cells scalemono-
tonically with the value of a planned saccade, when value is de-
fined according to the magnitude, probability, or delay of a juice
reward delivered for making that saccade (Sugrue et al., 2005;
Kable andGlimcher, 2009). This result, which has been replicated
in multiple tasks, supports the idea that saccade decisions can be
described in economic or reinforcement terms. However, this
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idea has significant limitations because it introduces irresolvable
confounds between reward and attention (Maunsell, 2004) and
cannot explain a range of empirical observations that, in addition
to their reward modulations, target selection cells respond
strongly to unrewarded cues [including salient distractors (Got-
tlieb et al., 1998; Bisley and Goldberg, 2003; Suzuki and Gottlieb,
2013), novel items (Foley et al., 2014), and even punishment-
predicting cues that are actively avoided in choice paradigms
(Leathers and Olson, 2012)]. These discrepancies beg the ques-
tion of how a value-based interpretation can be reconciled with
the natural role of saccades in sampling information (Gottlieb,
2012).
To examine this question, we tested LIP responses in an “in-
formational” context where visual stimuli brought information
about a reward but did not support a decision based on that
reward (Peck et al., 2009). As shown in Figure 1B, at the onset of
a trial, the monkeys had uncertainty about the trial’s reward and
viewed a brief visual stimulus that resolved this uncertainty, sig-
naling whether the trial will end in a reward or a lack of reward
(i.e., brought “good” or “bad” news). After presentation of the
cue inside or opposite the RF of an LIP cell, the monkeys were
trained to maintain fixation for a brief delay and then make a
saccade to a separate target that could appear either at the same or
at the opposite location. Therefore, the cues did not allow the
monkeys to make an active choice, but they could automatically
bias attention toward or away from their visual field location.We
detected these biases by comparing the postcue saccades that
were spatially congruent or incongruent with the cue location.
We found that both positive and negative cues evoked a sim-
ilar visual response shortly after their onset, suggesting that they
both transiently attracted attention (Fig. 1C). However, at
slightly longer delays, cues that brought “good news” produced
sustained neural excitation, whereas cues that brought “bad
news” produced sustained suppression in the neurons encoding
their location. Consistent with these neuronal responses, sac-
cades following a positive cue were facilitated if they were di-
rected toward the cue-congruent location, suggesting that “good
news” automatically attracted attention. By contrast, saccades
Figure 1. A, Cortical oculomotor areas. Lateral view of themacaque brain showing the approximate locations of the FEF and LIP.B, Task design A trial beganwhen themonkeys fixated a central
fixation point (small black dot). A reward cue (yellow star) was then presented for 300 ms at a randomly selected location that could fall inside the RF of an LIP cell (gray oval) or at the opposite
location (for simplicity, only the RF location is illustrated). The cue could fall into one of four categories depending on whether it was familiar (Fam) or novel (Nov) and signaled a positive () or a
negative () outcome. The cue presentationwas followed by a 600ms delay period duringwhich themonkeys had tomaintain fixation (“Delay”), and then by the presentation of a saccade target
at the same or opposite location relative to the cue. If the monkeys made a correct saccade to the target, they received the outcome predicted by the cue (a reward on Nov and Fam trials, but
no reward on Nov and Fam trials). Trials with incorrect saccades were immediately repeated. C, LIP neurons are modulated by reward and novelty Normalized activity (mean SEM) in a
population of LIP cells, elicited by cues that appeared in the RF and that could be familiar or newly learned and bring “good news” (predicting a reward; Nov and Fam) or bring “bad news”
(predicting a lack of reward; Nov and Fam). The cues appeared for 300ms (thick horizontal bar) andwere followedby a 600msdelay period duringwhich themonkeysmaintained fixation. The
familiar cues showed strong reward modulations, with Fam cues evoking a lower visual responses and sustained delay period suppression that was not seen for Fam cues. However, newly
learned cues elicited stronger overall responses andweaker rewardmodulations. In particular, Nov cuesdidnot elicit the sustained suppression seen for the Fam cues.D, Learningof cue-reward
associations as a functionof thenumber of cue exposures during a session. Thepoints show thedurationof anticipatory licking and thenormalized visual response (during the visual epoch, 150–300
ms after cue onset) as a function of the number of cue exposures during the session. Error bars indicate SEM. Anticipatory licking for the Nov cues declined rapidly, but the visual response elicited
by the Nov cue remained high throughout the session. Although the monkeys rapidly learn negative cue-reward associations, they are slower to reduce the salience of a “bad news” cue. B,
Reproduced with permission from Peck et al. (2009). C, D, Reproduced with permission from Foley et al. (2014).
15498 • J. Neurosci., November 12, 2014 • 34(46):15497–15504 Gottlieb et al. • Attention, Reward, and Information Seeking
following negative cues were impaired if they were directed to-
ward the cue-congruent location, suggesting that “bad news” au-
tomatically inhibited attention.
While these results are consistent with previously described
reward modulations, they differ in that they were not based on
operant rewards (the reward delivered by making a saccade) but
on mere stimulus–reward associations. In other words, learnt
reward associations modify salience, or the ability of a stimulus
automatically to bias attention. This conclusion is supported by
ample psychophysical evidence in human observers (see, e.g.,
Della Libera, 2009, #7519; Hickey, 2010, #8224; Anderson et al.,
2011, #8168).
This conclusion however, raises an important question: if sac-
cades are automatically biased by task-irrelevant rewards, how
can they serve the goal of sampling information? To address this
question, we examined how the neurons encode informational
properties, such as the novelty of a visual cue. Using the same
paradigm shown in Figure 2B, we introduced, along with the
highly familiar reward cues, cues that were novel on their first
presentation and were shown several times to allow the monkeys
to learn their reward significance (Foley et al., 2014). The mon-
keys rapidly learnt when a novel cue signaled “bad news” and
extinguished their anticipatory licking within the first few pre-
sentations (Fig. 1D, left). Strikingly however, the newly learned
cues continued to produce enhanced salience and LIP responses
for dozens of presentations (Fig. 1D, right). Therefore, salience is
enhanced by novelty independently of reward associations, sug-
gesting that it is also sensitive to the informational properties of
visual cues.
Gaze orienting based on long-term value memory: basal
ganglia mechanism
A challenge that animals face in natural behavior is the complex-
ity of the visual scenes, and the need to memorize multiple po-
tentially rewarding items. This is difficult to accomplish using
only short-term memory because of its low capacity (Cowan,
2001). Recent evidence suggests that the basal ganglia implement
a high-capacity mechanism that relies on long-term object-value
memories and can automatically orient gaze to high-valued ob-
jects. We propose that this process is analogous to an “object
skill” (Hikosaka et al., 2013) and allows animals and humans to
rapidly reach good objects and obtain rewards.
The basal ganglia play an important role in decision-making
by inhibiting unnecessary actions and disinhibiting necessary ac-
tions (Hikosaka et al., 2000; Gurney et al., 2001), and this mech-
anism can be used for gaze control. Indeed, experimental
manipulations of the basal ganglia in macaque monkeys lead to
deficits of gaze control (Hikosaka and Wurtz, 1985; Kori et al.,
1995). Among basal ganglia nuclei, the caudate nucleus (CD) acts
as a main gateway for gaze control by receiving inputs from cor-
tical areas (including FEF and LIP) (Selemon and Goldman-
Rakic, 1985; Parthasarathy et al., 1992), and relaying the signals to
the superior colliculus (SC) via the substantia nigra pars reticu-
lata (SNr) through direct and indirect pathways (Hikosaka et al.,
1993, 2000) (Fig. 2A).
Notably, many neurons composing the CD-SNr-SC circuit in
the monkey are strongly affected by expected reward (Hikosaka
et al., 2006). This was shown using a saccade task in which the
amount of reward varied depending on the direction of the sac-
cade. The saccade to the target occurred more quickly with a
higher speed when a larger reward was expected (Takikawa et al.,
2002). Correspondingly, the visual and presaccadic responses of
CD, SNr, and SC neurons were generally enhanced when a larger
reward was expected (Kawagoe et al., 1998; Sato and Hikosaka,
2002; Ikeda and Hikosaka, 2003). The behavioral and neuronal
responses to a given target changed quickly (in several trials)
when the associated reward amount changed blockwise (small-
large-small, etc.). In short, the CD-SNr-SC circuit encodes re-
ward values flexibly, relying on short-term memory.
However, recent studies show that neurons in a specific sector
of the CD-SNr-SC circuit encode reward values stably, relying on
long-term memory. Whereas previous studies were focused on
the head/body of CD (CDh/CDb), the CD has a caudal-ventral
extension called the “tail” (CDt), which is mostly unique to pri-
mates and receives inputs mainly from the inferotemporal cortex
(IT) (Saint-Cyr et al., 1990) (Fig. 2A). Amajority of CDt neurons
show differential responses to visual objects (similar to IT neu-
rons) (Caan et al., 1984; Brown et al., 1995; Yamamoto et al.,
2012), but often with contralateral RFs (unlike IT neurons)
(Yamamoto et al., 2012). Their outputs readily induce saccades
(Yamamoto et al., 2012) by disinhibition through their connec-
tion to the caudal-lateral SNr (Kim et al., 2014) and then to SC
(Yasuda et al., 2012).
Unexpectedly, unlike the neurons in CDh/CDb, neurons in
the CDt were hardly influenced by rapidly changing reward val-
ues (Yamamoto et al., 2013). Instead, they changed their visual
responses with prolonged experience across days, only when each
object was associated with a high or low reward value consis-
tently. Such stable value coding culminated at the caudal-lateral
SNr where most neurons were inhibited by stably high-valued
objects and excited by stably low-valued objects (Yasuda et al.,
2012) (Fig. 2B,C). The neurons showed such categorical re-
sponses to asmany objects as themonkey had experienced (so far,
300 objects), even after retention periods longer than 100 d. As
expected from the robust inhibitory SNr-SC connection, all the
monkeys tested (10) acquired a preference formaking saccades
to high-valued objects among low-valued objects quickly and
automatically, even with no immediate reward outcome (Fig.
2D). Importantly, this preference was disrupted by the reversible
inactivation of CDt, but only for objects presented in the con-
tralateral visual field (Kim andHikosaka, 2013). Our findings are
consistent with recent findings in humans (Anderson et al., 2011;
Theeuwes, 2012; Chelazzi et al., 2013) and monkeys (Peck et al.,
2009), showing that attention and gaze are captured automati-
cally by objects with reward associations, and suggest that the
CDt-SNr (caudal-lateral)-SC circuit contributes to the automatic
gaze/attention capture.
Gaze control in active behavior
In natural behavior, one of themost important roles of saccades is
to sample information to assist ongoing actions. For example,
while navigating through natural environments, humans must
gather visual information to control foot placement, avoid obsta-
cles, and control heading (Fig. 3A). Despite these multiple de-
mands on attention, subjects manage to select gaze targets to
sample the relevant information at the appropriate time. How is
this done, apparently so effortlessly, yet so reliably?
To address this problem, wemade the simplifying assumption
that complex behavior can be broken down into simpler and
largely independent modules or subtasks (Hayhoe and Ballard,
2014), and gaze is allocated based on competition between the
subtasks. For instance, in a walking task, one subtask involves
heading toward a goal and another avoiding obstacles. The prob-
lem of choosing the right sequence of gaze targets then reduces to
one of choosing which subtask should be attended at any mo-
ment (e.g., look toward the goal or look for obstacles).
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As described in the previous sections, neural and behavioral
evidence supports the idea that gaze is influenced by value con-
siderations and uncertainty, or the need to acquire new informa-
tion (Gottlieb, 2012). The role of uncertainty is less well
understood but is critical in a natural task. For example, when
walking on a well-known path, gaze choice will be less critical
becausemuch of the relevant information is available inmemory,
while in dynamic and unfamiliar environments subjects have
higher uncertainty and hence greater need for information. Un-
certainty arises from several sources. For example, peripheral ob-
jects may not be accurately localized or attended (Jovancevic et
al., 2006), meaning that fixation is needed to specify their precise
location. In turn, after fixating an obstacle, uncertainty about the
location of that obstacle is likely to grow with time because of
changes in the environment or memory decay, and another fixa-
tion might be required to obtain updated information. There-
fore, a key role of gaze is to choose targets to reduce uncertainty
about task-relevant visual information.
This principle has been captured in theoretical work by
Sprague et al. (2007) who developed a reinforcement learning
model for gaze allocation that incorporates reward and
uncertainty-based competition between modular subtasks. In
support of this model, we gathered empirical evidence that both
implicit reward (operationally defined by task goals) and uncer-
tainty determine where and when a subject fixates in a driving
task (Sullivan et al., 2012). In a more recent experiment, we in-
vestigated a walking task (Tong and Hayhoe, 2014) as illustrated
in Figure 3. Subjects walked in a virtual environment seen
through a head-mounted display and were instructed to stay
close to the narrow path, to avoid a set of floating blue obstacles,
and to intercept the brown targets. In different trials, subjects had
different instructions about what subtasks to give priority to
(“follow the path,” “follow the path and avoid obstacles,” or “fol-
low the path, avoid obstacles, and intercept targets,” etc.). We
also manipulated uncertainty about obstacle position by adding
different amounts of randommotion to the floating objects. Sub-
jects spent more time looking at the obstacles when they were
specifically instructed to avoid them (Fig. 3C, “task-relevant”),
and this increased gaze allocation resulted in more effective
avoidance. Adding uncertainty about obstacle position also in-
Figure 2. Basal gangliamechanism for automatic gaze orienting to stably high-valued objects.A, Basal ganglia circuit controlling gaze orienting. This scheme represents the circuit mediated by
the caudate tail (CDt), but equivalent circuits are present for the caudate head (CDh) or caudate body (CDb). CDt receives inputs from visual cortical areas, whereas CDh and CDb receive inputs from
the frontal and parietal cortical areas. Arrows indicate excitatory connections (or effects). Lines with circular dots indicate inhibitory connections. Unbroken and broken lines indicate direct and
indirect connections, respectively. B, An SNr neuron encoding stable values of visual objects. Shown superimposed are the neuron’s responses to 60 high-valued objects (red) and 60 low-valued
objects (blue). These objects (i.e., fractals) are shown in C. Before the recording, the monkey had experienced these objects with a large or small reward consistently for5 daily learning sessions
but had not seen them for3 d. Firing rates (shown by spike density functions) are aligned on the onset of the object (time 0). The object disappeared at 400 ms. The neuron was located in the
caudal-lateral part of SNr, which receives concentrated inputs from CDt (not CDh or CDb) and projected its axon to SC (as shown by antidromic activation). D, Free viewing task. On each trial, four
fractal objects were presented simultaneously and the monkey freely looked at them. Examples of saccade trajectories are shown by white lines. The monkey tended to look at stably high-valued
objects (denoted as H). No reward was delivered during or after free viewing. A, Reproduced with permission from Hikosaka et al. (2013). B, C, Reproduced from Yasuda et al. (2012).
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creased the time spent looking at obstacles, but only when they
were task relevant (Fig. 3C).
These results indicate that gaze control during complex sen-
sorimotor tasks is sensitive both tomomentary goals, or rewards,
associated with the task and to the uncertainty about environ-
mental states, consistent with the theoretical work of Sprague et
al. (2007). Uncertainty is an essential factor that needs to be taken
into account for a comprehensive theory of target selection, and
understanding its neurophysiological underpinnings and inter-
action with reward is a key question for future investigations.
Visual attention during simple choice
Casual observation suggests that visual attention plays an impor-
tant role inmany economic decisions. Consider a shopper choos-
ing a cereal box in the supermarket aisle. Confrontedwith dozens
of options, his eyes move from one option to another until he is
able to settle on a choice a few seconds later. This example moti-
vates two basic questions: How do fixations affect choices? And,
conversely, what determines what we fixate on while making a
choice?
A series of recent papers have proposed and tested a model of
how fixations affect simple choices, called the attentional drift
diffusionmodel (aDDM) (Krajbich et al., 2010, 2011, 2012). Fig-
ure 4A summarizes the model for the case of a binary choice,
where subjects make choices between pairs of snack food items
(Fig. 4B). Themodel assumes that a choice ismade by computing
dynamically a stochastic relative decision value (RDV) that pro-
vides a measure of the relative attractiveness of left versus the
right options. A choice is made the first time the RDV signal
crosses a preestablished barrier for either the left or right options.
Critically, the evolution of the RDV depends on the fixations,
such that at every instant it assigns greater weight to the value of
the item that is being fixated. Previous studies have shown that
this model can provide a highly accurate quantitative account of
the correlation between fixations and choices for the case of bi-
nary and trinary choice (Krajbich et al., 2010, 2011, 2012; Towal
et al., 2013), that the size of the attentional bias is sizable, and,
surprisingly, that the effect of attention is causal (Armel and Ran-
gel, 2008; Milosavljevic et al., 2012). Human fMRI studies have
shown that value signals computed in ventromedial prefrontal
cortex at the time of choice, and widely thought to drive choices,
are attentionally modulated in a way that could support the im-
plementation of the aDDM (Lim et al., 2011).
The fact that fixations seem to have a sizable impact on choices
motivates a deeper understanding of what determines the pattern
of fixations during simple choices. The aDDM assumes that fix-
Figure 3. Virtual reality experiments for measuring gaze behavior. A, The view seen by a subject walking in a virtual environment with floating blue obstacles that must be avoided. The brown
targets are to be intercepted, and the subject is instructed to stay close to the path indicated by the gray line. Thewhite crosshair shows the direction of gaze. Inset, Eye image from an Arrington eye
tracker mounted in the head-mounted display. B, View of the subject in the helmet. Both head and body position are tracked with a Hi-Ball system. C, Percentage of time spent fixating on the
obstacles when the obstacles are stationary (low uncertainty) or moving (high uncertainty). Top points indicate the condition when subjects are explicitly instructed to avoid the randomly placed
obstacles while following the path. In this case, fixations on obstacles provide task-relevant information. Bottom points indicate the condition when the subjects are instructed only to stay on the
path and collect targets. In this case, the obstacles are irrelevant. Data are mean SEM across 12 subjects.
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ation locations and durations are orthogonal to the value of the
stimuli and are not affected by the value of the items or the state of
the choice process. This is important because it assumes that
fixations affect choices but that neither the choice process nor the
value of the items affects fixations. This assumption is important
because it implies that any feature of the environment that affects
fixations can affect choices, even if it is unrelated to the underly-
ing desirability of the stimuli. This stark assumption seems to be
largely consistent with the data. Importantly, however, themodel
allows for a systematic influence of low-level visual features (e.g.,
relative brightness) on fixations, and through them on choices,
which has also been observed in experiments (Towal et al., 2013).
These results raise two important questions. First, can visual
attention be deployed in more sophisticated ways in more natu-
ralistic choice settings? In particular, a natural interpretation of
the experiments described above is that for simple choice tasks
with relative short reaction times (1–2 s), visual attentionmust be
guided by low-level features and does not have access to the state
of the choice process. An important feature of the previous tests
of the aDDM is that they were designed so that there was no
correlation between low-level features and any information
about values. But inmany naturalistic settings, such a correlation
might be present. For example, itmight be the case that your local
convenience store always places your favorite items on the left, in
which case your visual system could learn to place disproportion-
ately its attention toward the left to improve choices. We have
carried preliminary tests of this possibility and have found strong
support for it, as summarized in Figure 4C. Another important
feature of these experiments is that the stimuli are relatively novel
for the subjects, but in many choice situations subjects might
have developed strong stimulus–reward associations. The studies
described in the previous sections (Peck et al., 2009; Yasuda et al.,
2013) strongly suggest that these associations might bias atten-
tion to the best previously experienced products, which would
improve the performance of the aDDM.
Second, is visual attention influenced by the value of choice
options, and by the choice process, in more complex situations?
To see why this is important, consider again a shopper facing a
large number of options, and taking much longer to make the
decision. It is natural to hypothesize that the fixation pattern in
this task will change over the course of the decision, with random
fixations early on, but a top-down narrowing of attention to a
subset of the best options later on. Ongoing tests of this hypoth-
esis suggest that this is indeed the case. For example, as summa-
rized in Figure 4D, we found that fixation location and duration
were more sensitive to stimulus value during refixations (which
take place later in the trial) than during fixations (which take
place earlier).
Figure 4. A, Summary of the aDDM for binary choices. V denotes the RDV signal that determines the choice. Left/right refer to the location of the fixations. B, Sample binary choice used in
experiments. C, Probability that first fixation is to the left item in amodified binary choice task, as a function of condition and trial number. In green condition, best item is equally likely to be shown
on left or right. In red condition, best item is shown on left in 70%of trials. In blue condition, best item is shown on right in 70%of trials. The identity of the best item changes over trials.D, Number
of fixations and mean fixation duration as a function of choice set size and the value of the item. The green curve represents initial fixations. The blue curve represents refixations.
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Conclusions
The studieswe reviewed in the previous sections highlight the fact
that saccades are specialized for sampling information or, in
otherwords, accumulating evidence for ongoing actions. The fact
that saccades do so in a goal-directed fashion implies that the
brain has mechanisms for assigning priority to sources of infor-
mation based on the demands of the task, and these mechanisms
are only beginning to be investigated.
The first set of studies we discussed were conducted in mon-
keys, and suggest that one mechanism of saccade target selection
is based on prior learning of stimulus–reward (Pavlovian) asso-
ciations. Saccade-related responses in LIP and the basal ganglia
are enhanced for reward-associated visual cues. This learning is
slow and enduring and importantly, modifies salience automat-
ically even when visual stimuli are irrelevant for actions, consis-
tent with the phenomenon of value-driven attention capture
reported in human observers (Della Libera and Chelazzi, 2009;
Hickey et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2011).
The second set of studies we reviewed were conducted in hu-
man observers, and examine saccades in active paradigms, in-
cluding naturalistic sensorimotor behaviors and economic
decisions. Under these conditions, saccades have a bidirectional
relationship with the ongoing task. On one hand, saccades are
influenced by the nature and values of the ongoing actions. On
the other hand, saccades influence the task by selecting the sensory
information that most strongly impacts the observer’s actions.
A third and final factor, which is least understood, is the un-
certainty or informational demand of the task. Analysis of gaze
patterns in sensorimotor behaviors shows that gaze is strongly
sensitive to the relative uncertainty of competing subtasks, and a
central question for future investigations is how uncertainty and
reward-based control interact. In some circumstances, these fac-
tors may be closely aligned. For instance, when subjects are per-
forming a task, reducing uncertainty by definition increases the
future expected rewards. However, in other cases they can be
distinct. For instance, the value-based attentional capture de-
scribed in humans andmonkeysmay be useful for rapidly detect-
ing potential rewards in complex natural scenes, but it can also
introduce suboptimal biases by prioritizing desirable over accu-
rate information. Such “optimistic” biases are found in learning
paradigms and were implicated in risky behaviors due to under-
estimation of unpleasant information (Sharot, 2011). Thus, pars-
ing out the relative roles of reward and information gains, and the
neural mechanisms by which both reach the oculomotor system,
is a central question for understanding how the brain achieves
top-down control of attention and gaze.
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